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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
The court correctly found plaintiff's complaint failed to state
a cause of action. The bank was a mere agent of the government
and could only pay subject to the direction of its principal. 6
Negotiable Instruments Law
A couple approached a bank to obtain a loan for the purchase
of a car. After requiring them as payees to endorse a cashier's
check for $1,000 to a specific car agency, the bank issued the check
in return for a note for the same amount. Upon tender, a partner
of the agency noticed a further recital on the reverse side of the
check stating it was in full payment of a car. He declined to accept
the check, since he knew that the payees had already purchased a
car on which they owed a balance of only $200. The payees endors-
ed the check with the name of the agency and the purported signa-
tures of two agency officials and, a few days later, approached a
grocery store owner, with whom they had dealt previously. After
examining the endorsements, and requiring an endorsement in
blank from one of the payees, the storekeeper cashed the check.
Subsequently, the bank refused to honor the check.
The Court of Appeals held, in Hall v. Bank of Blasdel,"7 that
the plaintiff storeowner was a holder in due course, rejecting the
claim of the bank that under the facts plaintiff could not even be
a holder.
The defendant's argument was threefold:
1. since the check was not accepted by the agency, it was
never negotiated,58
2. the unauthorized signing of the agency's name as in-
dorsee was a forgery, 9 and
3. even if the payees had the power to endorse and de-
liver, they had not in fact done so.60
In rejecting the defendant's first assertion, the court pointed
out that this would necessitate a finding that the defendant re-
garded the payees as mere messengers, and intended to make the
agency the true party in interest." Since there was no indebted-
56. See In re Interborough Consol. Corp., 288 F. 334, (2d Cir. 1923) for comparison
with situation where a fund is set aside to meet declared dividend payments.
57. 306 N. Y. 336, 118 N. E., 2d 464 (1954).
58. Negotiable Instruments Law § 35.
59. Id. § 42.
60. Id. § 60.
61. The court distinguished Wolfin v. Security Bank of New York, 170 App. Div.
519, 156 N. Y. Supp. 474 (1st Dep't 1915), aff'd 218 N. Y. 709, 113 N. E. 1068 (1916).
There, the maker required the payee to endorse the instrument to the plaintiff, and in-
structed him to deliver the note to the plaintiff. It was held constructive delivery was
effected so as to vest the plaintiff with legal title to the instrument.
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ness or other obligation owed by the drawer to the agency, there
was no intent to confer a proprietary interest in the agency. The
bank did in fact intend that the check be used for a specific pur-
pose, but the existence of such a condition could not effect the
rights of an innocent third party.2" When the agency refused to ac-
cept the check, the endorsement to the agency no longer had any
legal signifiance.6 3 Hence, there was no basis for an assertion of
forgery, since an unauthorized signature is significant only if
the person seeking to enforce payment has acquired title "through
or under such signature." 64
The court then found that having the power to negotiate, the
payees had in fact done so. After the agency refused to accept
the check, the payees elected to treat the endorsement as "fictiti-
ous" and thus transformed the instrument into bearer paper 05
The court noted that while this is known as the "fictitious payee
doctrine" it applies as well to indorsees. The only operative fac-
tor is the intent of the indorser or drawer,66 and since he could
easily have made the check payable "to bearer," the law regards
him as having done so.
The case may well be regarded as a caveat to those who issue
negotiable paper to choose carefully the form in which that paper
is issued. If, as the court pointed out, the car agency had been
made the payee, either the limited purpose for which the check was
issued would have been fulfilled or the attempted further negotia-
tion of the check could have been effected by a signature of the
agency that would, in such circumstances, be a forgery.
V. CRIMInAL LAW
Statutes
a. Purview of Vagrancy Statute: Some broad language in
the New York vagrancy statute' centered the attention of the Court
of Appeals in People v. Gould,2 wherein defendant was convicted
under that statute, having suggested in vain to a policewoman in
62. Supra, note 58.
63. Id. § 78; McNeill v. Shellito, 185 App. Div. 857, 173 N. Y. Supp. 810 (1st
Dep't 1919).
64. Supra, note 59; Britton, Bills and Notes, 697 (1943).
65. Negotiable Instruments Law § 28 (3).
66. Phillip v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 140 N. Y. 556, 35 N. E. 982 (1894) ; Cohen v.
Lincoln Say. Bank of Brooklyn, 250 App. Div. 702, 274 N. Y. Supp. 488 (1st Dept 1937),
aff'd 275 N. Y. 399, 10 N. E. 2d 457 (1937).
1. CODE CRm. Paoc. § 887 (4) (b) defines a vagrant as "A person . . . who offers
or offers to secure another for the purpose of prostitution, or for any other lewd or inde-
cent act . . .."
2. 306 N. Y. 352, 118 N. E. 2d 553 (1954).
